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Abstract
Improper string manipulations are an important cause of software defects, which make
them a target for program analysis by hackers and developers alike. Symbolic execu-
tion based program analysis techniques that systematically explore paths through string-
intensive programs require reasoning about string and bit-vector constraints cohesively.
The current state of the art symbolic execution engines for programs written in C/C++
languages track constraints on a bit-level and use bit-vector solver to reason about the col-
lected path constraints. However, string functions incur high-performance penalties and
lead to path explosion in the symbolic execution engine. The current state of the art string
solvers are written primarily for the analysis of web applications with underlying support
for the theory of strings and integers, which limits their use in the analysis of low-level pro-
grams. Therefore, we designed a decision procedure for the theory of strings and bit-vectors
in Z3-str2, a decision procedure for strings and integers, to efficiently solve word equations
and length functions over bit-vectors. The new theory combination has a significant role
in the detection of integer overflows and memory corruption vulnerabilities associated with
string operations. In addition, we introduced a new search space pruning technique for
string lengths based on a binary search approach, which enabled our decision procedure
to solve constraints involving large strings. We evaluated our decision procedure on a
set of real security vulnerabilities collected from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE) database and compared the result against the Z3-str2 string-integer solver. The
experiments show that our decision procedure is orders of magnitude faster than Z3-str2
string-integer. The techniques we developed have the potential to dramatically improve
the efficiency of symbolic execution of string-intensive programs.
In addition to designing and implementing a string bit-vector solver, we also addressed
the problem of automated remote exploit construction. In this context, we introduce a
practical approach for automating remote exploitation using information leakage vulner-
ability and show that current protection schemes against control-flow hijack attacks are
not always very effective. To demonstrate the efficacy of our technique, we performed an
over-the-network format string exploitation followed by a return-to-libc attack against a
pre-forking concurrent server to gain remote access to a shell. Our attack managed to
defeat various protections including ASLR, DEP, PIE, stack canary and RELRO.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Decision procedures or constraint solvers have recently gained considerable importance
both in research and industry as essential tools in addressing hardware and software ver-
ification problems [24, 27, 69, 42, 65]. Our ability to solve logical assertions efficiently
is crucial to the success of program analysis, verification, and automated testing tools
[18, 19, 59, 60, 30]. The reason is that these tools are typically designed to generate math-
ematical logic formulas that characterize behaviors of the program-under-test, and then use
off-the-shelf constraint solvers to solve them. In order to be effective, these solvers must be
efficient and expressive enough to capture program behavior. For example, typical theories
supported by solvers include the quantifier-free first-order theory of bit-vectors that can
effectively model machine arithmetic, the quantifier-free theory of arrays that can model
memory, and the theory of uninterpreted functions and integers to model abstractions of
program state.
In recent years, there is significant interest in reasoning about string-manipulating pro-
grams written in C/C++/Java/JavaScript due to security issues associated with improper
handling of untrusted string values. Researchers have come up with various powerful string
solvers such as Z3-str2 [69], CVC4 [42], S3 [65] etc. to tackle these problems. These tools
solve the satisfiability problem over the quantifier-free theory of string equations, regular
expression (RE) membership predicates, and linear arithmetic over the length function.
These tools gained much popularity in analyzing security vulnerabilities in web applica-
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tions because they handle strings as a primitive data type and provide a tight integration
of string length with the integer theory. However, a fundamental problem associated with
these string solvers is that it is not clear at present, whether the satisfiability problem
for the quantifier-free theory of word equations, regular-expression membership predicate
and length function is decidable. Therefore, all current practical string solvers suffer from
incompleteness and non-termination. Even so these solvers have proven to be very useful
in the analysis of string-manipulating programs.
Lack of bit-vector [27] support is the major deficiency in current string solvers that limit
their application in the analysis of low-level system codes. We are motivated by the above
problem to build a solver for the combination of bit-vectors and strings. The reason for
this particular combination is two-fold (1) bit-vectors can efficiently model the behavior
of C/C++ programs (2) string solver can efficiently reason about the string operations
by interpreting the string as a primitive data type. An array of bit-vectors is the best
choice to represent the memory of a program. Also, it is well known that the quantifier-
free fragment of bit-vectors abbreviated as QF BV is very useful for reasoning low-level
system descriptions in languages such as C and Verilog which uses finite precision integer
arithmetic and bit-wise operations on bit-vectors. Moreover, the arithmetic used by digital
computers is bounded, and consequently it is often more efficient or appropriate for a
variety of applications to capture program behavior in bounded or bit-vector arithmetic.
Symbolic execution engines for C/C++ programs, such as KLEE [19] and S2E [21] rely on
the above criteria to model the state and memory of programs. These applications often
symbolically analyze code, generate constraints for the decision procedure to solve and use
the results of the decision procedure to guide further analysis to generate new test cases.
The above-mentioned problems motivated us to design a decision procedure for the
theory of strings and bit vectors atop of Z3-str2 with an efficient integration of the under-
lying theories. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other native string solver that
reason about strings and bit-vectors at the same time. We designed a binary search based
heuristic for efficiently pruning the search space of string lengths while solving constraints
on large string operations. Also, we integrated this heuristic into our base solver Z3-str2, a
decision procedure for strings and integers, and our experiments reported that the binary
search based approach is about 229 times faster than naive approach implemented in the
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prior version of the Z3-str2 solver.
In addition to the above-mentioned contributions, we also developed an automatic
exploit generation technique. The motivation for developing this technique is to showcase
the power of modern program analysis in automating many aspects of the hacking process,
and effectively evading widely deployed protection mechanisms. The major protection
schemes deployed in modern machines are Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). DEP allows the processor to mark writable memory
locations such as stack and heap not to contain executable code. Thus, it prevents the
code injection attack by making all writable memory segments as non-executable. ASLR
limits the capabilities of a resource-bounded attacker by randomizing the base address of
the stack, heap, code, and the memory mapped segments of an executable. A compile-
time randomization technique called Position Independent Executable(PIE) strengthen
ASLR by enabling the binary to be loaded and executed at any memory address without
modifying it. Aside from these techniques, many compile-time attack defenses protect
programs from control-flow hijack attacks, one of which include, placing canary values
between a function’s local variables and its return address. These canaries cannot prevent
buffer overflows, but they can detect them retroactively and terminate the program before
an attacker can influence control flow.
Even though there are many attack defenses and these safeguards have raised the bar
significantly, attackers propose innovative attack models and enumerate different tech-
niques to bypass these defenses. Among them, information leakage vulnerabilities play a
significant role in revealing the internals of secured systems, where an attacker can lever-
age subtle information from program memory to augment the state of the art exploita-
tion techniques. Therefore, we also addressed the problem of automated remote exploit
construction. In this context, we introduced a practical approach for automating remote
exploitation using information leakage and memory related vulnerabilities and showed that
current protection schemes against control-flow hijack attacks are not always very effective.
Contributions
To summarize, this thesis makes the following principal contributions:
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• Decision procedure for a theory of strings and bit-vectors: We designed a
decision procedure for the theory of strings and bit vectors atop of Z3-str2 with an
efficient integration of the underlying theories. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no other native string solver that reason about strings and bit-vectors at the same
time.
• Binary search based heuristics: We designed a binary search based heuristic for
efficiently pruning the search space of string lengths while solving constraints on large
string operations. Also, we integrated this heuristic into our base solver Z3-str2, a
decision procedure for strings and integers. The binary search based approach is
about 229 times faster than naive approach implemented in the prior version of the
Z3-str2 solver.
• Experimental study: We evaluated the decision procedure on a set of real vul-
nerabilities collected from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database.
Also, we evaluated the binary search based heuristics on a set of benchmarks and
compared to other state of the art string solvers.
• Automated Exploit Synthesis: We performed an automated remote exploitation
breaking major attack defenses such as ASLR, DEP, PIE, RELRO, and Stack Ca-
naries in a modern Linux machine by making use of information leakage and buffer
overflow vulnerabilities.
Thesis overview
We organize the thesis into two parts. In the first part, we discuss the decision procedure
for the logic of strings and bit-vectors and how the state of the art logic combination could
be used in the vulnerability detection when the traditional solvers fail. In Chapter 1, we
discuss the new decision procedure for the theory of strings and bit-vectors, its constraint
language, and basic solving technique. Chapter 2 gives a detailed evaluation of the solver
in real vulnerabilities and other benchmarks. In the second part, we discuss our work on
automated exploit synthesis. Chapter 3 describes the techniques and automated system
for vulnerability detection, information leakage, and control flow hijack attacks. Also, we
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explain an automated remote exploitation attack that bypasses all known attack defenses
in the latest Linux machine.
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Chapter 2
Bit-vector Support in Z3-str2 Solver
In this chapter, we present a decision procedure for the combined theory of string and
bit-vectors. This decision procedure takes an input formula over the quantifier-free theory
of string equations, bit-vector arithmetic, and length function that takes input as a string
and outputs a bit-vector. If the input formula is satisfiable, the decision procedure outputs
a satisfying assignment, else declares that the input is unsatisfiable. Symbolic execution
based program analysis techniques are extensively used in the detection of security vul-
nerabilities in low-level programs written in C/C++. However, these techniques are not
efficiently employing the power of string solvers due to the limitation of its underlying the-
ories. We were motivated to design and implement this decision procedure for the program
analysis of low-level string manipulating C/C++ programs.
Chapter Overview
This chapter is divided into nine sections. In section 1, we provide a brief background of
SMT solvers, various theories of interest, solving of string equations and its application in
software engineering. In section 2, we introduce the problem we are solving. In section
3, we motivate the importance of string plus bit-vector combinations comparing to other,
state of the art theory combination for hunting security vulnerabilities. In section 4, we
describe the constraint syntax and semantics of our logic of bit-vectors and strings. Then
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we introduce various APIs for integrating this logic to the powerful Z3-str2 solver. Section 5
explains the design, the core solving algorithm and implementation of the solver. Section 6
gives a detailed discussion of the motivating example. Section 7 presents our experimental
method followed by our various results and comparison. We present the previous attempts
and other related work for solving string equations in section 8. Finally, our future work
plans are depicted in section 9.
2.1 Background
This section gives a brief background about SMT solvers, various supporting theories,
solving string equations and its application in program analysis and automated testing.
2.1.1 SMT Solvers
Decision procedures gained much interest both in research and industry for hardware and
software verification problems. The ability to solve logical assertions is essential in several
tools that perform program analysis, verification, and automated testing. In computer
science and mathematical logic, the satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) problem [8] is a
decision problem for logical formulas with respect to combinations of background theories
expressed in classical first-order logic with equality.
2.1.2 First Order Theories
Full first-order logic is not decidable, and many applications only require satisfiability over
a syntactically restricted subset of full FOL, thus the SMT solvers consider the satisfiability
of formulas with respect to some of these background theories. A couple of relevant theories
of interest are discussed as below.
• Bit-vectors: Bit-vectors are extremely useful data structures used in symbolically
representing hardware and software constructs. The world of bit-vectors is finite,
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and it is not possible to represent arbitrarily large numbers by bit-vectors. Each
term of bit-vector sort is associated with a fixed width that indicates the number of
bits used to represent the value of the term. The function and predicate symbols in
these theories may include extraction, concatenation, bit-wise Boolean operations,
and arithmetic operations.
• Linear Arithmetic: Linear arithmetic is a restricted theory of arithmetic where
only addition and subtraction can be used; multiplication of arbitrary terms is not
allowed.. These functions can be applied to either numerical constants or variables.
The relations between equality and inequalities (=, <) are used for forming atomic
predicates. Presburger [6] showed that the general satisfiability problem for the
theory of linear integer arithmetic TLIA is decidable, but its complexity is triply-
exponential where the quantifier-free satisfiability problem is NP-complete. How-
ever, non-linear arithmetic is undecidable even for the quantifier-free case. In the
case of linear real arithmetic the satisfiability problem for TLRA is decidable, but its
complexity is doubly exponential.
• Uninterpreted functions: In pure first-order logic, function and constant symbols
are uninterpreted or free, in other words, there is no a priori interpretation attached
functions and constant symbols. However, this is in contrast to functions belonging
to the signature of theories, such as arithmetic where the function + has a fixed
standard interpretation. They allow any interpretation that is consistent with the
constraints on the function or constant. Given a conjunction of equalities between
terms using free functions, a congruence closure [46] can be used for representing the
smallest set of implied equalities.
• Arrays: Theories of arrays are commonly used to model actual array data structures
in programs. They are also often used as an abstraction for memory. The advantage
of modeling memory with arrays is that the size of the model depends on the number
of accesses to memory rather than the size of the memory being modeled.
8
2.1.3 Solving String Equations
Makanin [44] was the first to show that quantifier-free theory of word equations is decid-
able in 1977, considered a theoretical breakthrough. Since then many mathematicians have
improved Makanin’s result [58, 35, 52, 53, 34]. Plandowski [53] showed the complexity of
this problem was in PSPACE [53] in 2006. Despite decades of effort the status of the satis-
fiability problem for the theory of word equations, length functions and regular expression
membership predicates(Twlr) is still open, i.e., it is not known whether it is decidable [45].
The resolution of this question would be a breakthrough, given its connections to Hilbert’s
Tenth problem [45]. Hence, all currently available solvers for the theory Twlr are in fact
semi-decision procedures.
2.1.4 Solvers in Software Security
Constraint solvers are of tremendous value in automated testing and software security.
The last decade has seen some success in deploying program verification tools to industrial
software. The main techniques for program verification include theorem proving, model
checking, and symbolic execution. These techniques use powerful constraint solvers due
to the following reasons. Machine arithmetic is bounded and efficiently modeled by the
theory of bit-vectors, a theory of arrays can represent memory locations such as stack and
heap, and a theory of uninterpreted functions and integers can be used to abstract program
state. Thus, solver-based techniques and tools for precise security analysis helps to reason
about various corner cases that could violate the desired security policy. Furthermore,
solver-based analysis tools are often more robust and easier to build than others.
2.1.5 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution [38] is a program analysis technique that gathered great recognition
in the last few years and are widely implemented in several tools in research and industry
for automated test case generation and vulnerability detection in complex software appli-
cations. The key idea behind this approach is to run the program on a symbolic input
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to explore paths systematically through a program by reasoning about the feasibility of
explored paths using a constraint solver. When the program execution encounters a branch
that is directly or indirectly controlled by the symbolic input, appropriate constraints are
added on each side of the branch, and the execution is conceptually forked to follow both
sides if feasible. Finally, whenever a path terminates or hits an error, the constraints
gathered on that path are solved to produce a concrete input that exercises the path.
Modern symbolic execution techniques have the power of mixing concrete and symbolic
execution. In one of the approaches named Directed Automated Random Testing (DART)
[30], or Concolic testing [60] symbolic execution is performed dynamically while the pro-
gram is executed on some concrete input values. Another class of approach is based on
execution generated testing, where both symbolic and concrete executions are mixed by
dynamically checking before every operation if the values involved are all concrete. A re-
cent technique called selective symbolic execution [21] uses a bidirectional symbolicconcrete
state conversion that help the execution to seamlessly and correctly weave back and forth
between symbolic and concrete mode.
Significant advances of constraint solving techniques in the past few years are the pri-
mary reason for the success of symbolic execution techniques. Bit-vector solvers are used
in the analysis of low-level programs written in C/C++ whereas, string solvers are widely
used for detecting security vulnerabilities in web application domains. KLEE [19] and S2E
are two widely used symbolic execution engines for programs written in unsafe languages
like C/C++, and Kudzu [57], Jalangi [59] and SymJS [39] [40] are well known symbolic
execution engines using string solvers for JavaScript programs.
2.1.6 Integer Overflow Vulnerabilities
Integer overflow vulnerabilities are the result of an operation on an integer value that
causes it to exceed the maximum possible value or decrease below its minimum possible
value. Because of this, the number wraps and resulting a very large number to become very
small or vice versa. These vulnerabilities could only be revealed using bit-vector solvers as
bounded arithmetic is the primary reason for these overflows. When these overflow bugs
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occur on calculating some buffer size, it results in severe security vulnerabilities leading to
stack or heap overflows. There are three types of integer overflow vulnerabilities
• widthness overflows [1]: occur when the code tries to store a value in a variable
that is too small (in the number of bits) to handle it: a typical situation is when
a variable of a given type is cast into another one whose type is smaller than the
original one.
• arithmetic overflows: occur when a calculation produces a result that is greater
in magnitude than that which a given target type can accommodate.
• signedness bugs [1]: occur when an application fails to differentiate between both
signed and unsigned integers when measuring the lengths of buffers, and confuses
the signed type with unsigned one at some point. Therefore, the signed value is
interpreted as its unsigned equivalent, meaning that a negative number becomes a
large positive number.
2.2 Problem Statement
Symbolic execution based program analysis techniques are extensively used in the detection
of security vulnerabilities in low-level programs written in C/C++. However, these tech-
niques are not efficiently employing the power of string solvers due to the limitation of its
underlying theories. Design a decision procedure for the theory of strings and bit-vectors
to improve the efficiency of symbolic execution engines and to expose vulnerabilities that
remain hidden when using traditional string solvers.
2.3 Motivation
Our primary motivation behind the decision procedure for the logic of strings and bit-
vectors is to provide significant performance improvement in the symbolic execution of
programs written in C/C++. Improper string manipulations are an important cause of
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software defects, which make them a target for program analysis. A study [54] on the con-
colic testing tools and their limitations shows that there are significant portions of string
operations in system level codes and which add additional overhead to current symbolic ex-
ecution engines. In current symbolic execution techniques, there is a semantic gap between
the high-level notion of strings and low-level representation of program states and memory.
Bit-vector solver is an unavoidable part of low-level program analysis as it need to capture
constraints with bit-level precision to efficiently reason about arithmetic overflows, bitwise
operations, and pointer casting. Also, symbolic memory is also modeled as an array of
bit-vectors and binary instructions as operations in bit-vector theory. Symbolic execution
engines like KLEE and S2E collect constraints as bit-vectors by symbolically executing each
branch in program statements and solve it using powerful constraint solvers like STP[27]
and Z3[24]. However, these engines perform poorly on programs containing string func-
tions as it fails to capture the high-level semantics of string data type in accordance with
the low-level bit-vector representation of all program data.
Current symbolic execution engines that track constraints on a bit-level cause the path
explosion problem when string functions are iterated character by character through their
inputs. Typically string functions, such as strlen or strcmp, mainly consist of loops that
iterates character by character through one or multiple input strings until a particular
condition is met, for instance until the current character is the null terminator, marking
the end of the string. Given that each character in the string is checked for the terminating
condition, the symbolic execution engine will fork one new state for each symbolic character,
leading to path explosion. For example, an invocation of the string library function strlen
on a symbolic string s of size N will generate a total of N + 1 paths, one for each possible
value of the length, between 0 and N , regardless of the usage of this return value throughout
the rest of the program. In essence, uninteresting part of code regions are explored by
enumerating each branch without efficiently pruning the search space. Prior works from the
S2E [21] group explained these performance bottlenecks with the strings in their symbolic
analysis. These limitations forced us to apply string solvers that reason string as a primitive
data type similar to integers and bit-vectors, in the context of symbolic execution. However,
to the best of our knowledge there are no other native string solver that reason about strings
and bit-vectors at the same time.
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Moreover, it is tough to detect certain classes of security vulnerabilities arising from
certain overflow and underflow errors with the state of the art string solvers. As the theory
of integer is unbounded, the existing string solvers are not very efficient to reason about
arithmetic overflow and underflow errors. Therefore, heap memory corruption vulnerabil-
ities originated from integer overflows mostly remain undetected by the state of the art
program analysis techniques that use traditional string solvers. This kind of security vul-
nerabilities inspired us to propose a new theory combination for the underlying solver to
efficiently reason about different corner cases leading to overflows and memory corruptions
when used with existing program analysis techniques. For instance, if we analyze the his-
tory of integer related overflows in CVE database, we can see that operations on the large
value of strings are one of the primary sources of integer overflow vulnerabilities. These
bugs remain undetected by most of the analysis engines if we use traditional string solvers,
that focus the analysis of string functions in scripting languages and web applications.
Existing string solvers primarily support the theory of strings and integers and they do
not need to reason about the low-level memory when identifying vulnerabilities in web ap-
plications. However, integer related vulnerabilities typically arise in low-level applications
written in C/C++, when the developer fails to take account of the upper bound defined
for the data type.
We will explain the limitations of existing string solvers in the context of low-level
program analysis and the importance of a latest theory combination using a motivating
example. Consider the check login() function shown in Figure 2.1. Here, the program
calculates the length of the user controlled input value username, adds 1 to accommodate
the trailing null character. A new buffer is allocated for the resulting size and copies
the username into it using the strcpy function. This code behaves as intended for the
normal-sized input. However, an integer overflow occurs if the user submits a username
consisting 65,535 characters. The variable len is declared as unsigned short in which the
size of the variable is 16 bit long and can hold any value between 0 and 65,535. When a
string of length 65,535 is submitted as username, the result of strlen(username)+1 wraps
to become 0 causing integer overflow. Also, the integer overflow causes a zero size buffer
to be allocated in the heap due to malloc(), and the long username is copied into it,
causing a heap overflow. We encode the assertions in SMT-LIB format by hand for the
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bool check_login(char* username, char* password){
unsigned short len = strlen(username)+1;
if(len > 32){
invalid_login_attempt();
exit(-1);
}
char* _username= (char*) malloc(len);
strcpy(_username, username);
...
}
Figure 2.1: Overflow vulnerabilities in login module
vulnerable path of the program. Using the same set of constraints solvers like Z3-str2
which has native support for the theory of strings and integer is very inefficient to solve
the constraints. However, the decision procedure for the theory of strings and bit-vectors
finds the vulnerability and generates a satisfying model.
2.4 Constraint Syntax and Semantics
The syntax of word equations and the lengths are defined using the following notions.
We fix a disjoint two-sorted set of variables var = varstr ∪ varbv; varstr containing string
variables, denoted X, Y, S, . . . and varbv consists of bit-vector variables, denoted m,n, . . ..
We also define a two-sorted set of constants Con = Constr∪Conbv. Moreover, Constr ⊂ Σ∗
for some finite alphabet, Σ, whose elements are denoted f, g, . . .. Elements of Constr will be
referred to as string constants or strings. Elements of Conbv are constant sized bit-vectors.
Terms may be string terms or bit-vector terms. A string term is either an element of varstr,
an element of Constr, or a concatenation of string terms (represented by the function concat
or interchangeably by · operation). The strlen bv() is used to represent the length function
of string terms. The empty string is represented by , and its length is a bit-vector value of
zero. A bit-vector term is an element of varbv, an element of Conbv, the strlen bv() function
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Term:bool ::= Var:bool
| true
| false
| (Contains Term:string Term:string)
| (StartsWith Term:string Term:string)
| (EndsWith Term:string Term:string)
| (RegexIn Term:string Term:regex)
Term:int ::= Var:int
| Number
| ({+,−,×,÷} Term:int Term:int)
| (Length Term:string)
| (IndexOf Term:string Term:string)
| (IndexOf2 Term:string Term:string Term:int)
| (LastIndexOf Term:string Term:string)
Term:BitV ecn ::= Var:BitV ecn
| (BitV ecConstn)
| ({+,−,×,÷} Term:BitV ecn Term:BitV ecn ) →BitVecn
| (strlen bv Term:string ) →BitVecn
| (CharAt BV Term:string Term:BitV ecn ) →BitVec8
Term:string ::= Var:string
| ConstStr
| (Concat Term:string Term:string)
| (Substring Term:string Term:int Term:int)
| (Substring BV Term:string Term:BitV ecn Term:BitV ecn)
| (Bv2Str Term:BitV ec8 )
| (BvArray2String Term:ArrayBitV ecn Term: BitV ecn)
| (Replace Term:string Term:string Term:string)
| (CharAt Term:string Term:int)
Term:regex ::= (Str2Regex ConstStr:string)
| (RegexStar Term:regex )
| (Term:regex)+
| (Term:regex)?
| (RegexConcat Term:regex Term:regex)
| (RegexUnion Term:regex Term:regex)
Expr:bool ::= Term:bool
| (= Term:bool Term:bool)
| (not Expr:bool)
| (and Expr:bool Expr:bool)
| (or Expr:bool Expr:bool)
| (ite Expr:bool Expr:bool Expr:bool)
| (implies Expr:bool Expr:bool)
| ({<,≤,=,≥, >} Term:int Term:int)
| (= Term:string Term:string)
Assertion ::= (assert Expr:bool )
Figure 2.2: The input language of Z3-str2
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applied to a string term, a constant bit-vector multiplied by a bit-vector term, or a sum
of bv terms. The theory contains two types of atomic formulas, namely, word equations
and length constraints. This decision procedure supports a list of common string-related
operators such as CharAt, Contains, Endswith, Indexof, Lastindexof, Replace, Substring and
etc,. which are original to the base solver along with strlen bv, CharAt BV, Substrting BV,
Bv2str, BvArray2String etc,. Formulas are defined inductively over atomic formulas and
are quantifier-free. The constraint syntax for the decision procedure is presented Figure 2.2.
2.5 Design and Implementation
In this section, we explain the design overview of the constraint solver Z3-str2. Further,
we explain how word equations are solved in Z3-str2 followed by the solving algorithm.
Later we explain the new search space pruning technique based on the binary search in
the context of underlying solver modes.
2.5.1 Design Overview
The decision procedure for the theory of bit-vectors and string is built atop of Z3-str2 [69].
The base solver Z3-str2 is essentially a string plug-in built into the Z3 SMT Solver [24], with
an efficient integration between the string plug-in and Z3’s integer solver. The architectural
schematic of the Z3-str2 string solver is given in Figure. 2.3 in which the word equations
are solved with respect to the underlying integer solver.
The solver in the string plus bit-vector mode purifies input into bit-vector and string
constraints. The string constraints are solved using string plug-in and bit-vector constraints
through Z3’s bit-vector solver. The plug-in may consult the Z3 core to detect equivalent
terms. The word equations are solved using an algorithm described in detail in the sec-
tion 2.5.3 below. The length constraints are converted into a system of pure integer linear
arithmetic inequations and solved using Z3’s bit-vector solver. The interaction between
the bit-vector and string theory is explained in the section 2.5.4
16
Figure 2.3: Architecture of Z3-str2 solver [69]
2.5.2 Solving Word Equations
The word equation solving component of our decision procedure for the theory of strings
and integers is inherited from the base solver Z3-str2 [69]. Starting with the work of
Makanin [44], many decision procedures [53, 58, 34] have been proposed. While most
procedures are not accompanied by practical implementations, they are a rich source of
ideas for all the solvers that have recently been implemented. For example, the Z3-str2
solver follows ideas, namely, boundary labels, generalized word equations, and arrangements
that have their roots in the very first decision procedure for word equations by Makanin.
The key technique used by Z3-str2 [69] to solve a word equation W is to recursively
convert W equisatisfiably into the disjunction of conjunctions of simpler equations we call
arrangements. These arrangements are computed by aligning the concatenation function
on the LHS and RHS of a given equation such that an occurrence of concatenation function
in the LHS (resp. RHS) may “split” or “cut” variables on the RHS (resp. LHS). There are
many different alignments of variable boundaries in the LHS (resp. RHS) that can split
variables in the RHS (resp. LHS). We call every such alignment an arrangement. The
crucial fact about word equations is that every equation can be equisatisfiably rewritten
into a finite set of arrangements, where each arrangement is a finite set of word equations
obtained from the splitting procedure. The Z3-str2 solver exploits this fact and solves
word equations by converting them into finite sets of arrangements and inspecting each
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one individually to see if they are satisfiable. The input word equation is SAT if and only
if at least one arrangement is SAT. This, in a nutshell, is how the Z3-str2 solver solves the
word equations, i.e., by recursively converting equations into a disjunction of arrangements
(where each arrangement is a simpler set of equations) until a set of arrangements is derived
where the satisfiability is determined purely via inspection. While simple, elegant and
efficient for typical equations obtained from program analysis, the word equation solver
described here may fall into infinite loops when the word equation contains overlapping
variables. However, Z3-str2 solver has support for detecting overlapping variables and the
technique for the detection of overlapping variables is well presented in [69].
Label Arrangements: We leverage boundary labels to reason about the relative
positions of the subparts in words, such that we can reduce the original equations to a
set of smaller equations for the corresponding subparts until the equations become so fine-
grained that the solution can be directly inferred. The set of input equations is UNSAT
if none of the possible breakdowns leads to valid solutions. In this subsection, we explain
how to split equations into smaller ones based on the arrangements and how to determine
if equations are in solvable form. A formula (i.e. a conjunction of equations) is in solvable
form if each equation is either an equivalence between a variable and a character, or
equivalence between two variables.
Formula Transformation: Now we discuss how to generate arrangements from equa-
tions and generate arrangements for variables from equation arrangements. Once a variable
arrangement is selected, the constraints for its sub-parts (i.e. their alignments with other
variables and characters) are determined. Therefore, we discuss how to split equations to
represent the constraints on sub-parts.
The process consists of two steps.
• In the first step, a variable is split to a set of new variables according to the variable
arrangement. Each equation is rewritten by replacing each variable with the split
variables.
• In the second step, each equation is divided into a set of new equations, each con-
straining a sub-part of the original equation. This process is guided by determining
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the common labels between the label sets of the LHS and RHS words of the equations
generated in the first step.
A formula defined as the conjunction of equations is said to be in solvable form if
each equation is either an equivalence between a variable and a character, or equivalence
between two variables. For variables that are directly or indirectly (i.e. through other
variables) equivalent to a character, their solution is the character. The solving process,
namely the consistency condition in arrangement production ensures that the same variable
is not equivalent to different characters. Variables that are not equivalent to any character,
directly or indirectly, are free variables such that we can assign any characters to them.
Overlapping arrangement detection brings the following significant benefits. If the input
formula is UNSAT, and it may have overlapping arrangements, a decision procedure with-
out detecting overlaps will inevitably lead to an infinite loop in formula reduction. Overlap
detection also allows the procedure to avoid exploring the overlapping arrangements and
quickly find the non-overlapping solutions. If the input formula is SAT and the solution
does not contain any overlapping arrangement, our procedure will be able to reach the
solvable form.
2.5.3 Algorithm
The decision procedure for the theory of bit-vector and strings inherits all the major fea-
tures of its predecessor Z3-str2 for solving word equations such as boundary labels, word
equation splits, label arrangements and detection of overlapping variables. However, it
differs from the Z3-str2 in reasoning about the length constraints derived from the word
equations and in search space pruning strategy for reaching consistent lengths. The pro-
cedure is summarized in Algorithm 1. It takes a formula F , produces SAT, UNSAT or
UNKNOWN results. UNKNOWN means that the algorithm has encountered overlap-
ping arrangements and pruned those arrangements, even though it did not find any SAT
solution.
The algorithm consists of three steps. In step one, it generates the set of possible ar-
rangements for each equation and selects one from the set to proceed. In the next step,
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Algorithm 1 High-level description of the word equation solving
Input: Qw: word equations, Ql: bit-vector constraints over length function
Output: SAT / UNSAT / UNKNOWN
1: procedure solveStringConstraint(Qw, Ql)
2: if all equations in Qw are in solved form then
3: if Qw is UNSAT or Ql is UNSAT then
4: return UNSAT
5: end if
6: if Qw and Ql are consistently SAT then
7: return SAT
8: end if
9: end if
10: H=StringBvIntegration(Qw)
11: convert Qw equisatifiably into DNF formula Qa
12: for each disjunct D in Qa do
13: A= all possible arrangements of equation in D
14: for each arrangement A in A do
15: lA=extract the length constraint implied by A from H
16: if lA is inconsistent with bit-vector theory then
17: Remove arrangement A from A
18: end if
19: end for
20: for each arrangement combinations do
21: split each variable to sub-variables based on the selected arrangement
22: convert Qw equisatifiably to Q′w of simpler equations
23: Q′l be the new set of length constraints
24: r=solveStringConstraint(Q′w,Q
′
l)
25: if r=SAT then
26: return SAT
27: end if
28: end for
29: end for
30: if overlapping variables have ever been detected then
31: return UNKNOWN
32: else
33: return UNSAT
34: end if
35: end procedure
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variable arrangements for each variable are computed based on the previously selected
equation arrangements where each variable may have multiple arrangements. In the third
step, the formula is split based on the selected variable arrangements. The algorithm
checks an overlapping arrangement has ever detected and pruned. If so, the procedure
returns UNKNOWN; otherwise, it returns UNSAT. The essence of the algorithm is to
discover all the boundaries that are correlated and search for a total order of them. This
decision procedure also detects infinite loops in formula reduction by identifying overlap-
ping arrangements. Also, the procedure can always find the solution arrangement if it is
non-overlapping.
2.5.4 String and Bit-vector Theory Integration
During the solving process, the string plug-in may generate length constraints that are
incrementally added on demand to Z3’s bit-vector solver, that are regularly checked for
consistency with both the input length constraints and previously added ones. On any
well-formed input as described in section 2.4, the decision procedure may return SAT, UN-
SAT or UNKNOWN. On inputs containing bit-vector and string constraints, if either Z3’s
bit-vector solver or the string plug-in determines that their respective purified inputs be
UNSAT, decision procedure reports UNSAT. When both the bit-vector and string solver
returns SAT and establishes a consistency between their results, the decision procedure re-
turns SAT. If the string plug-in detects that the input equations have complicated overlaps
that its heuristics cannot handle, it reports UNKNOWN. This is a source of incompleteness
in the implementation of the base solver Z3-str2. Note that Z3-str2, like other competing
solvers such as CVC4, is sound but not complete.
Basic Length Rules
The basic length assertion on strings X, Y and Z can be expressed as follows. In the
constraint language lX , lY and lZ are represented by strlen bv(X,n), strlen bv(Y, n) and
strlen bv(Z, n) respectively where n is the bit-vector sort. Null string is represented by .
1. lX ≥ 0
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2. lX = 0 ⇐⇒ X = 
3. X = Y =⇒ lX = lY
4. X · Y · Z · ·· =⇒ lX + lY + lZ + · · ·
Theory Interaction
When solving the word equations, the solver for the strings and bit-vectors generates new
assertions in the domain of the other theory and vice versa. Inside the string theory, the set
of arrangements that is explored is constrained by the assertions on string lengths, which
are provided by the bit-vector theory. On the other hand, the string theory will derive new
length assertions when it makes progress in exploring new arrangements. These assertions
are provided to the bit-vector theory so that the search space is pruned. The procedure
for string and bit-vector theory integration is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Consider the word equation X ·Y = M ·N where X, Y,M and N are non empty string
variables. It has three possible arrangements [69] as shown below where T1 and T2 are
temporary string variables.
1. (X = M · T1) ∧ (N = T1 · Y )
2. (X = M) ∧ (N = Y )
3. (M = X · T2) ∧ (Y = T2 ·N)
The corresponding length assertions derived from the above three arrangements are as
follows
1. (lX = lM + lT1) ∧ (lN = lT1 + lY )
2. (lX = lM) ∧ (lN = lY )
3. (lM = lX + lT2) ∧ (lY = lT2 + lN)
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These length assertions are added to the Z3 core and then processed using the bit-vector
theory. We use a binary search based heuristics to search the value of each length variable
in the bit-vector theory. The search space pruning technique is explained in the section
2.5.5. For instance, if the bit-vector theory infers that lX > lM and lN > lY the string
theory only needs to explore the first arrangement, and the procedure can converge faster.
Algorithm 2 Integration between theory of strings and bit-vectors
Input: Word equations(Qw)
Output: Hash table of length assignments
1: procedure StringBvIntegration(Qw)
2: H= Hash table of length(Lstr) and bit-vector value
3: for each equation E in Qw do
4: A= all possible arrangements of E
5: for each arrangement A in A do
6: L= all implied length constraints
7: for each length L in L do
8: Lbv be the length implied by bit-vector theory
9: low=LOWER BOUND
10: high=UPPER BOUND
11: while low ≤ high do
12: mid=low+(high-low)/2
13: if Lbv=mid then
14: Add (L,mid) into H
15: break
16: else if Lbv > mid then
17: low=mid+1
18: else
19: high=mid-1
20: end if
21: end while
22: end for
23: end for
24: end for
25: return H
26: end procedure
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2.5.5 Pruning the Search Space via Binary Search
Even though the tight interaction between these theories improved the solving time to
a great extent; the decision procedure performs poorly on inputs containing large values
of length constraints. In Z3-str2, the string theory and integer theory works in parallel
pruning search space to find consistent string lengths using naive linear search based tech-
niques. Once the consistency is fixed between string variables and their lengths, value
arrangements are performed for further solving. However, the linear search consumes a
significant amount of solving time for choosing consistent length value when dealing with
large length constraints that further impose additional performance overhead for the de-
cision procedure. Therefore, we designed a new search space pruning technique based on
the binary search with heuristics support for Z3 core’s backtracking functionality. We im-
plemented this technique in the base solver along with the new decision procedures and
found that the solving time decreased dramatically as presented in the section 2.7.2.
String - bit-vector solver: In the theory of bit-vectors, we can always restrict vari-
ables within a lower and upper bound. If we select a bit-vector variable of sort n, the value
of the variable will always be between 0 and 2n−1. We implemented a binary search based
heuristic for guiding the search, relying on its fixed upper and lower bounds. Therefore,
the heuristic for adding length assertions to the bit-vector theory follows a binary search
pattern and can solve constraints involving large strings very efficiently.
The string plug-in continuously queries the underlying theory to get a suitable length
for each variable through Z3 core. For instance, consider the constraint lX ≥ 52000 where
X is a string variable and lX represents the length operation. The prior version of the
Z3-str2 solver, linearly samples the search space and adds assertions for each value of the
sample space. The Z3 core pick one assertion from the given set and verifies it with the
underlying theory, and backtracks to try another assertion if it is not consistent. The
assertions added in the first iterations are (lX = 0) ∨ (lX = 1) ∨ (lX = 2) ∨ (lX ≥ 2),
and in the second iteration (lX = 3) ∨ (lX = 4) ∨ (lX = 5) ∨ (lX ≥ 5) is added and so
on. Say initially Z3’s core picks the assertion lX = 2 but it is not consistent with our
length constraint. Therefore, the core backtracks and try another assertion, for instance,
lX ≥ 2 to further continue the search procedure. In essence, the string plug-in needs to
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add the assertion in a linear order till it finds a valid one. The same process has to be done
for all string variables to find the consistent length that significantly reduces the solver
performance.
In binary search based procedure, for instance with a bit-vector sort of 16, we have the
lower bound as 0 and the upper limit as 65535. In the first iteration, string solver adds
assertion (lX < 32767) ∨ (lX = 32767) ∨ (lX > 32767) to the Z3’s core and in the second
iteration the assertion becomes (lX < 49151) ∨ (lX = 49151) ∨ (lX > 49151), and so on.
Following the binary search pattern, the solver quickly finds a valid length assignment for
lX in few iterations.
String - integer solver: Z3-str2 in the string plus integer mode also suffer the same
performance issue when solving large string lengths; as a remedy to this, we ported our
technique into the base solver as well. However, the major challenge was that we could not
fix an upper bound for integer theory, and the traditional binary search based technique
option ruled out in the first place. This motivated us to design new heuristics, driven by
binary search and backtracking, to guide the search. In this approach, we chose a window
with concrete lower and upper bound in which the size of the window varies dynamically
in each iteration depending on the search criteria. We perform the binary search within
the window while sliding the window from lower to higher values to find an upper bound.
In other words, the lower and upper end of the window is modified when the window slides
and the window size expands or shrinks by the order of two. The backtracking ability
of the heuristics helps to guide the search and choose previous windows when the Z3’s
core backtracks. The heuristics for the theory of strings and integers is summarized in
Algorithm 3.
2.6 Discussion of Motivating Example
In section 2.3 we discussed a motivating example shown in Figure 2.1. In this section,
we give a detailed analysis of our example, using the latest decision procedure for strings
and bit-vectors against the original version of Z3-str2. Here, the program calculates the
length of the user controlled input value username, adds 1 to accommodate the trailing null
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Algorithm 3 Binary search based heuristics for string-integer solver
Input: lX
Output: Integer value
1: procedure GetConsistentLength(lX)
2: Lint be the length implied by integer theory
3: low=0
4: high=2
5: upper bound fixed=false
6: while low ≤ high do
7: mid=low+(high-low)/2
8: if Lint= mid then
9: return mid
10: else if Lint > mid then
11: low=mid+1
12: if not upper bound fixed then
13: high=2*high
14: end if
15: else if Lint < mid then
16: upper bound fixed=true
17: high=mid-1
18: end if
19: end while
20: end procedure
character. A new buffer is allocated for the resulting size and copies the username into it
using the strcpy function. Even though the program tries to exit when len > 32, the attack
can be triggered using specially crafted input. The variable len is declared as unsigned
short in which the size of the variable is 16 bit long and can hold any value between 0 and
65,535. When a string of length 65,535 is submitted as username, the result of username+1
wraps to become 0 causing integer overflow. Also, the integer overflow causes a zero size
buffer to be allocated in the heap due to malloc(), and the long username is copied into
it, causing a heap overflow.
Figure 2.4 represents the constraints encoded in the SMT-LIB format for the Z3-str2
solver. In the above set of constraints username, username are modelled as string vari-
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(declare-variable username String)
(declare-variable _username String)
(declare-variable len Int)
; len=strlen(username)+1
(assert (= len (mod (+ (Length username) 1 ) 65535)))
; len<32
(assert (< len 32 ))
(assert (= (Length _username) len ))
(assert (> (Length username) (Length _username) )); overflow condition
Figure 2.4: Path constraints for string - integer solver of Z3-str2
ables, and len as an integer variable. The path constraints to trigger the vulnerability is also
encoded in the form of assertions. The solver in the string plus integer theory took more
than twenty hours and timed out because of expensive modular arithmetic constraints.
It is shown in the same set of constraints in the language of strings and bit-vectors as
presented in Figure 2.5. In the program, len is of type unsigned short and is encoded as a
bit-vector variable of width 16. The vulnerable path conditions are exactly same as that of
the one presented for the theory of strings and integers but are expressed in the language
of strings and bit-vectors. The new decision procedure solved the constraints as SAT and
produced a model in 0.27 seconds. The solver returned an empty string for username, 0
for len and a 65535 character string for username.
2.7 Experimental Results and Evaluation
This section presents the experiments and evaluation of the results to compare our tech-
niques against the state of the art solvers.
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(declare-variable username String)
(declare-variable _username String)
(declare-variable len (_ BitVec 16))
;len=strlen(username)+1
(assert (= len (bvadd (strlen_bv username 16) (_ bv1 16) )))
;len<32
(assert (bvult len (_ bv32 16) ))
(assert (= (strlen_bv _username 16) len))
;strlen(username)>strlen(_username)
(assert (bvugt (strlen_bv username 16) (strlen_bv _username 16)))
Figure 2.5: Path constraints for the solver of strings and bit-vectors
2.7.1 Evaluating the Solver for Strings and Bit-vectors
We did an analysis of heap overflow vulnerabilities identified in string-manipulating pro-
grams in the common vulnerabilities and exposure (CVE)[2] database. We found that the
overflow or underflow in arithmetic computations on buffer size was the primary reason
for these bugs, leading to severe heap overflows and memory corruptions. Therefore, we
are interested in capturing such vulnerabilities using the decision procedure for strings
and bit-vectors. To demonstrate the efficacy of the theory combination of bit-vectors and
strings, we selected seven real vulnerabilities from the CVE database. For the benchmarks
discussed below, we analyzed the vulnerable part of the code regions manually and ex-
pressed path constraints in the SMT-LIB [12] format. The handcrafted constraints are
solved using the decision procedure for the theory of strings and bit-vectors and compared
the result against Z3-str2 solver with native string and integer theory support.
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Google Stagefright Vulnerabilities
Stagefright is the name given to a potential exploit that lives fairly deep inside the Android
operating system. Mobile security firm Zimperium [9] announced the exploit as part of the
BlackHat conference, and believed to be the worst Android vulnerability ever discovered.
StageFright is a system service for Android implemented in native C++ to handle multiple
media formats. Many integer overflows and underflows leading to code injection attacks,
present in the libstagefright media library is the main reason for stagefright vulnerability.
All devices running the Android versions Froyo 2.2 to Lollipop 5.1.1 are affected which
estimates approximately 95% of all Android devices and cover around 1 billion peoples.
Applications using the stagefright library run under the media permission. However, if the
attack succeeds, then the attacker can view corresponding files in the media library and
control the device through privilege escalation attack.
We briefly explain the exploitation nature of the vulnerability and proceed with the
analysis in the below sections. To trigger the vulnerability, an attacker sends a multi-
media message (MMS) containing malware to any messenger apps that can process the
specific media. Stagefright library is not only used for playing media files but also for
generating thumbnails automatically by extracting metadata like length, height, width,
frame frequency, channels and other information from video and audio files. Consequently,
when users view the thumbnails included in the malicious MMS, this vulnerability would
be triggered. The most alarming about it is that the user does not even have to open the
message or watch the video to activate the attack. The built-in applications like Hangouts
automatically process videos and pictures from MMS messages to have them ready in the
phone’s gallery app. We chose two vulnerabilities from this package to see if the decision
procedure for the theory of bit-vectors and strings can solve path constraints leading to
the overflow bug.
CVE-2015-3824: Google Stagefright ’tx3g’ MP4 Atom Integer Overflow Re-
mote Code Execution
This vulnerability is associated with the ’tx3g’ atom that refers to the text metadata con-
stitutes the first benchmark. An MPEG-4 is composed of several units called atoms or
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status_t MPEG4Source::parseChunk(off64_t *offset) {
...
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
...
case FOURCC(’t’, ’x’, ’3’, ’g’):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
...
}
Figure 2.6: Stagefright tx3g MP4 atom integer overflow
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boxes. These atoms begin with a header, size, and a box type. The box types contain a
four character code such as ’covr’, ’esds’, ’tx3g’ etc,. The Android’s media server encoun-
ters vulnerabilities while reading those boxes. The buggy part of the code is presented in
Figure 2.6. Here, a buffer is created dynamically in which the size computed by adding
variables, and the values of the user controlled variables can be selected to cause an integer
overflow that further leads to a heap overflow. Analyzing the erroneous code fragment we
can see that the size is guaranteed to be greater than 0 when mLastTrack→ meta→ find-
Data returns true. The new operator creates a buffer using the sum of size and chunk size
as its parameter. The chunk size is read from a file, and it is a uint64 t variable. However,
the parameter of the new operator is defined as size t and the size of which varies accord-
ing to the underlying architecture leading two different scenarios. In a 32 bit architecture,
size t is 32 bit long, and the result get truncated causing an integer overflow whereas in
64-bit architecture, the size t is 64 bit, and an enormous value of chunk size can lead to
an arithmetic overflow. Thus, the integer overflow leads to the creation of a small sized
buffer on the heap which further results in a heap overflow with the memcpy() function
call. We abstracted the program state, manually encoded the path constraints into a set of
constraints in string plus bit-vector and string plus integer each in their SMT-LIB format
and solved it using Z3-str2 in different modes. The string plus bit-vector solver success-
fully produced a satisfying model while native solver with integer theory failed to solve the
constraints.
CVE-2015-3826: Google Stagefright 3GPP metadata buffer overread
The second vulnerability is the ”Google Stagefright 3GPP metadata buffer overread” as-
sociated ’covr’ box type that deals with the album cover artworks. The vulnerable part of
the code is presented in Figure 2.7. If the ’chunk data size’ value is SIZE MAX, an integer
overflow will occur and cause a small buffer to be allocated, and the following call to rea-
dAt will overwrite memory locations. We expressed the constraints for the path triggering
the vulnerability in SMT-LIB format and solved using Z3-str2. The string plus bit-vector
solver produced a model for the input constraints while string-integer solver failed.
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status_t MPEG4Source::parseChunk(off64_t *offset) {
...
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
...
switch(chunk_type) {
...
case FOURCC(’c’, ’o’, ’v’, ’r’):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, buffer->data(),
chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
...
...
}
Figure 2.7: Stagefright 3GPP metadata buffer overread
CVE-2009-0585: libsoup Integer Overflow
libsoup is a library that provides HTTP client/server routines for GNOME. Integer overflow
in the soup base64 encode function in soup-misc.c in libsoup 2.x.x before 2.2.98 and 2.x
before 2.24, allows context-dependent attackers to perform code injection attack via a long
string that is converted to a base64 representation. The vulnerable part of the source code
is presented in Figure 2.8, where the function soup base64 encode encodes a sequence of
binary data into its Base-64 stringified representation and returns the Base-64 encoded
string representing text. Heap memory is allocated through g malloc() using a length
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calculated by a user supplied, platform specific value. In the above code integer len at the
place where the allocation occurs can wrap around if it contains an enormous value. Thus,
if a large untrusted input is passed to the function, an insufficient amount of memory is
allocated, followed by a heap-based buffer overflow with the Base64 encoded data. We
verified the vulnerable part of the code using the decision procedure for the theory of
bit-vectors and strings by generating a satisfying model that can trigger the vulnerability
while string plus integer solver failed to solve constraints.
char *
soup_base64_encode (const char *text, int len)
{
unsigned char *out;
int state = 0, outlen, save = 0;
out = g_malloc (len * 4 / 3 + 5);
outlen = soup_base64_encode_close ((const guchar *)text,
len,
FALSE,
out,
&state,
&save);
out[outlen] = ’’;
return (char *) out;
}
Figure 2.8: libsoup integer overflow
FreeBSD wpa supplicant(8) Base64 Integer Overflow
This bug [4] was reported to the FreeBSD, and it affects 7.2 stable releases of the FreeBSD.
The wpa supplicant utility is an implementation of the WPA Supplicant component. It
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unsigned char * base64_encode(const unsigned char *src,
size_t len,
size_t *out_len){
unsigned char *out, *pos;
const unsigned char *end, *in;
size_t olen;
int line_len;
olen = len * 4 / 3 + 4; /* 3-byte blocks to 4-byte */
olen += olen / 72; /* line feeds */
olen++; /* nul termination */
out = os_malloc(olen);
if (out == NULL)
return NULL;
...
}
Figure 2.9: FreeBSD wpa supplicant(8) Base64 Integer Overflow
implements WPA key negotiation with a WPA authenticator with an authentication server.
Figure 2.9 shows is the buggy code as seen in src/contrib/wpa supplicant/base64.c from
FreeBSDs CVS. During the first arithmetic operation, len is multiplied with constant
values. However, the type of len and olen is size t therefore the size varies according
to the underlying architecture. The len taints the olen variable, which is used as the
argument of os malloc() for allocating memory in heap. If len is a large value, it leads to
an integer overflow and a heap memory corruption in the subsequent call to os malloc(). We
abstracted the program behavior, encoded constraints for the vulnerable path into SMT-
LIB and compared the results of Z3-str2 with different modes of theory combination. The
decision procedure for the theory of string and bit-vectors solved the constraints generating
a satisfying model when the string plus integer solver failed.
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CVE-2009-2463: Mozilla Firefox/Thunderbird Base64 integer overflow
This bug [7] was disclosed by Mozilla in 2009. The issue affects the Base64 routines in
Mozilla Firefox before the 3.0.12 release. The vulnerability consists of an integer overflow
followed by a heap overflow in the PL Base64Encode function in some 32-bit architectures
that help remote attackers to cause a denial of service or code injection attacks. The
vulnerable part of the source code is explained in the Figure 2.10. In the PL Base64Encode
function, the variable destLen is of type PRUint32 where the value is calculated from an
arithmetic expression containing srclen. As per the Mozilla documentation, the PRUint32
data type is defined as an unsigned int or an unsigned long depending on the platform.
The srclen is the length of src, a user controlled string. Therefore the value of dataLen
is tainted by user input and can cause integer arithmetic overflow by providing a large
src. Also, destLen is used as the parameter of PR MALLOC() for allocating memory in
heap space leading to a heap memory corruption. We abstracted the program state and
expressed the path constraints in the SMT-LIB format for triggering the heap overflow
vulnerabilities and solved it using Z3-str2. The Z3-str2 solver failed to solve in the native
mode supporting strings and integers. However, the solver returned a returned a satisfying
model in the bit-vector plus string mode.
CVE-2002-0639: Integer and heap overflows in OpenSSH 3.3
Integer overflow in sshd [3] in OpenSSH 2.9.9 through 3.3 allows remote attackers to execute
arbitrary code during challenge response authentication when OpenSSH is using SKEY or
BSD AUTH authentication. Figure 2.11 shows the code excerpt from OpenSSH 3.3 leading
to a classic integer overflow. In the vulnerable code, the variable nresp stores an integer
value read from the client using packet get int() function, and packet get string() method
returns a pointer to a buffer that resides on heap containing a string read from the client.
The value of nresp can be set to an extremely long value to cause integer arithmetic overflow
in the argument of xmalloc() function and thereby to allocate zero sized buffer. In such a
case, the subsequent loop iterations cause heap buffer to overflow. We encoded the path
constraints for triggering heap overflow into the SMT-LIB format and solved it using two
different combinations of theories in Z3-str2. The string plus bit-vector solver generated
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PR_IMPLEMENT(char *)
PL_Base64Encode
(
const char *src,
PRUint32 srclen,
char *dest
)
{
if( 0 == srclen )
{
srclen = PL_strlen(src);
}
if( (char *)0 == dest )
{
PRUint32 destlen = ((srclen + 2)/3) * 4;
dest = (char *)PR_MALLOC(destlen + 1);
if( (char *)0 == dest )
{
return (char *)0;
}
dest[ destlen ] = (char)0; /* null terminate */
}
encode((const unsigned char *)src, srclen, (unsigned char *)dest);
return dest;
}
Figure 2.10: Mozilla Firefox/Thunderbird Base64 integer overflow
a satisfying model in this benchmark as well while the string plus integer solver failed to
solve the constraints.
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...
nresp = packet_get_int();
if (nresp > 0) {
response = xmalloc(nresp*sizeof(char*));
for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
}
...
Figure 2.11: Integer and heap overflows in OpenSSH 3.3
CVE-2005-0180: Linux Kernel SCSI IOCTL Integer Overflow
The primary reason for the vulnerability is the lack of sufficient sanitization performed on
user-controlled integer values before employed as the size argument of a user space to kernel
memory copy operation. The vulnerable part of the code is presented in the Figure 2.12.
The sg scsi ioctl() function contains two signed integers textitin len and textitout len, read
from user space. In the definition of copy from user() function, the third parameter is
of type unsigned long. However, the function takes in len as its third parameter when
calling from sg scsi ioctl(). Therefore when a negative value in the in len variable is type
cast into unsigned long and result in very large value and cause memory overflow. The
decision procedure for the theory of strings and bit-vectors solved the manually generated
path constraints expressed in SMT-LIB format and produced a model for triggering the
vulnerability. However, the solver with native support for the theory of strings and integers
failed to solve the constraints.
2.7.2 Evaluation of Search Space Pruning Technique
The binary search based approach with backtracking functionality helps to prune the search
space efficiently when the input contains operations on large values of strings. The tech-
nique was initially designed for the decision procedure of bit-vectors and strings and later
ported into the base solver for strings and integers because of its superior performance in
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static int sg_scsi_ioctl(struct file *file, request_queue_t *q, ...){
char *buffer = NULL;
int bytes;
int in_len, out_len; /* two integers */
...
if (get_user(in_len, &sic->inlen)) /* read from user space */
return -EFAULT;
if (get_user(out_len, &sic->outlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (in_len > PAGE_SIZE || out_len > PAGE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
...
bytes = max(in_len, out_len);
if (bytes) {
buffer = kmalloc(bytes, q->bounce_gfp | GFP_USER);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
memset(buffer, 0, bytes);
}
...
if (copy_from_user(buffer, sic->data + cmdlen, in_len))
goto error;
...
}
Figure 2.12: Linux kernel SCSI IOCTL integer overflow
solving equations containing large values of strings. We used the string-integer solver for
the comparison and performance evaluation of the binary search approach. We performed
two set of experiments for this evaluation and discussed in the below subsections.
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Table 2.1: Performance of Z3-str2 over string lengths
Benchmark Length (l) Result
Binary Search
(seconds)
Naive Search
(seconds)
test1 10 SAT 0.042 0.040
test2 50 SAT 0.045 0.041
test3 100 SAT 0.039 0.051
test4 500 SAT 0.041 0.254
test5 1000 SAT 0.055 0.928
test6 5000 SAT 0.056 46.699
test7 10000 SAT 0.088 Timeout
test8 50000 SAT 0.323 Timeout
test9 100000 SAT 0.842 Timeout
test10 500000 SAT 21.084 Timeout
test11 1000000 SAT 105.636 Timeout
Performance Evaluation of String Lengths in Z3-str2
The first set of experiments is to demonstrate the inefficiency of the naive search in the
prior version of Z3-str2. For this purpose, we chose a tiny constraint set containing only
the length function. The constraints we chose are of the form lengthstr = l, where l varies
in the order presented in the Table 2.1. There is a total of 11 test inputs. We used 200
seconds as the timeout per test case. The stable release of the Z3-str2 solver in the naive
search mode solved constraints of length up to 5000 and timed out afterward. The solver
took more than 12 hours to terminate when the length is the order of 105. However, the
solver in the binary search mode performed very efficiently and solved the constraints of
length up to 1 million. The comparison of the solving time for the two modes in Z3-str2 is
shown in Table 2.1 and the cactus plots in Figure 2.13.
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Figure 2.13: Cactus plots for the length test
Evaluation on benchmark suite
To measure the efficacy of our approach we designed a benchmark suite containing 205
test cases, containing handcrafted constraints involving operations on large strings. The
benchmark consists of constraints on various string operators supported by Z3-str2 such
as Length, Concat, Indexof, Substring, EndsWith, StartsWith, Replace etc,. Furthermore,
we translated the constraints into the language of CVC4 and compared the performance
of the benchmarks against CVC4 of version 1.5. We performed all the experiments on a
workstation running Ubuntu 12.04 with an i7-3770 CPU and 8GB of RAM memory. We
used 200 seconds as the timeout per benchmark.
The results of the comparison are presented in the Table 2.2, where Tool reports error
counts the number of inputs on which the solver reports an error. Crash instead, refers to
run-time errors such as segfaults. The SAT and UNSAT denotes the number of sat and
unsat results respectively. According to the Table 2.2, Z3-str2 with binary search solves
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Table 2.2: Performance on benchmark suite
Z3-str2
(Binary Search)
Z3-str2
(Naive Search)
CVC4
SAT 169 138 126
UNSAT 34 34 19
UNKNOWN 2 2 0
Timeout 0 31 60
Tool reports error 0 0 0
Crash 0 0 0
Total no. of benchmarks 205 205 205
Total time (sec) 41.697 (1x) 9569.639(229x) 12014.893(264x)
† ’unknown’ indicates Z3-str2 detected and avoided overlapping arrangements.
all test instances very quickly comparing to the others. Z3-str2 with the naive search
timed out with 200 seconds on 31 test cases where CVC4 timed out in 60 test cases. The
Z3-str2 solver detects the overlapping arrangements in both search modes and produces
”UNKNOWN” result. Neither of these solvers crashed or reported errors in any of the test
instances. The cactus plots for the sat and unsat results are presented in the Figure 2.14
and Figure 2.15 respectively. Comparing the overall time taken by the solvers Z3-str2
with the binary search approach beats the others on the run. The overall time of the
binary search based approach is 41.697 seconds for these 205 test cases, where that of
naive approach is 9569.639 seconds and that of CVC4 is 12014.893 seconds. The binary
search based approach is about 229 times faster than naive approach of Z3-str2 and 288
times faster than CVC4.
2.8 Related Work
Practical methods for solving string equations can be roughly categorized into bounded
and unbounded methods. HAMPI [37] is a well-known solver for string constraints over
fixed-size string variables. The constraints in HAMPI express the membership in regular
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Figure 2.14: Cactus plots for the benchmarks: SAT instances
and fixed-size context-free languages. The main limitation with HAMPI is that, it requires
the user to provide an upper bound on string lengths. The solver was initially designed
for detection of SQL injection vulnerabilities where input problems are reduced first to
bit-vector problems and then solved using STP [27]. Also, HAMPI does not support direct
string comparison and other string operations such as indexof, substring, etc,.
Kaluza, the core of a JavaScript symbolic execution framework named of Kudzu [57],
is another popular solver that supports both string and non-string operations. This solver
extends HAMPI’s input language to multiple string variables of bounded length. Kaluza
constraints contain word equations over string variables, membership in regular languages,
and inequality formulas over string length. However, one major drawback of Kaluza is that
it requires the lengths of string variables to be known before being able to encode them
and query the underlying SMT solvers. In particular, before solving for string constraints,
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Figure 2.15: Cactus plots for the benchmarks: UNSAT instances
Kaluza finds a set of satisfying solutions for each string length. Then for each possible
length, it encodes string variables as an array of bits and then queries the underlying
bit-vector solver.
CVC4 [42] is an open-source automatic theorem prover for Satisfiability Modulo Theory
(SMT) problems. The string solver in CVC4 uses a set of algebraic techniques for solving
constraints over the theory of unbounded strings, natively supporting the length and reg-
ular language membership, without reduction to other problems. It uses an off-the-shelf
solver for integer linear arithmetic and a string solver for string and regular expression con-
straints. The string solver contains theory specific derivation rules that assert additional
string and RL constraints to the congruence closure module. The combination between the
string solver and the arithmetic solver is achieved using Nelson-Oppen rule, by exchanging
equalities over shared terms. The Kleene star operator for regular language constraints is
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processed by unrolling the operator and makes the solver non-terminating in general over
such constraints. Even though the solver is incomplete and non-terminating in general, it
is sound and supports a large set of operators that can be used to solve string constraints
arising from verification and security applications efficiently. Also, CVC4 has extensive
supports SMT-LIB format.
S3 [65] is another word based state of the art solver for unbounded strings based on older
version of Z3-str. This solver is incremental and expressive. S3 performs the incremental
reduction on string variables using the try-and-backtrack procedure of Z3 core until the
variables are bounded by constant strings. S3 reasons the Kleene star and other recursively
defined functions by lazily unfolding its semantics in the process of incremental solving. In
general, S3 can be viewed as an extension of Z3-str with regular expressions, membership
predicates, and some high-level string operations that often work on regular expressions
such as search, replaceAll, match, etc,.
Norn [10] is another a decision procedure for word equations over string variables of
arbitrary lengths with support for length constraints and regular expressions. Norn first
converts the given formula to DNF and recursively splits the equalities and membership
constraints. It then extracts the length constraints from the formula and solves it us-
ing PRINCESS [15] solver. This decision procedure specifically targets model checking
applications and is implemented in a prototype model checker to verify common string
manipulating functions such as the Hamming and Levenshtein distances.
PISA [64] is the first solver that provides a path and index sensitive string analysis
targeting static analysis of web applications. The verification is conducted by encoding
relationships among strings and regular expressions of a program in Monadic Second-Order
Logic(M2L). PISA then uses a theorem prover such as MONA to check the satisfiability of
the generated constraints. However, in PISA expressiveness of the arithmetic operations
are restricted due to the limitations of M2L, so it does not support numeric multiplications
and divisions.
Regular languages (or automata), as well as context-free grammars (CFGs), can be used
to represent strings and handling regex-related operations. A different approach for solving
string constraints with regular expressions is to encode them into automata problems. One
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of the major works in this category is Java String Analyzer (JSA) [22], in which static
analysis is used to model flow graphs of Java programs to capture dependencies of string
variables. Finite automata can be computed from the graph to reflect possible string
values. Shannon et al. [62] used finite state machines (FSMs) to model strings. They do
not support integer constraints in general even they have ad-hoc rules for integer relations.
A primary challenge faced by automata-based approaches is to capture the connections
between strings and other domains, e.g., integers. In short, using automata (regular)
language representations potentially enables the reasoning of infinite strings and regular
expressions. However, most of the existing approaches have difficulties in handling string
operations related to integers such as length, substring, indexOf, etc,. JST [29] extends
JSA. It asserts length constraints in each automaton and handles numeric constraints
after conversion. PISA [64] encodes Java programs into M2L formulas that it discharges
to the MONA solver to obtain path- and index-sensitive string approximations. PASS
[41, 39] combines automata and parameterized arrays for efficient treatment of unsat cases.
Stranger is a powerful extension of string automata with arithmetic automata [66, 68].
2.9 Future Work
The ongoing interaction with bit-vector and string theory is achieved using the binary
search based approach as discussed before. Even though such technique gives superior
performance in reasoning about string lengths, we still face inefficiency in the value ar-
rangements of strings after we fix the string lengths. So one of our next primary goals is
to optimize the performance of the solver by providing more robust techniques to value
arrangements, replacing the naive approach implemented in the base solver. Also, we
would like to add various APIs to extend our constraint language. We are also planning
to integrate the decision procedure in symbolic execution engines like S2E and Triton.
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Chapter 3
Automated Exploit Synthesis
In this chapter, we describe our technique for automated exploit generation. There are
many protection schemes against control flow hijack attacks on both application and op-
erating system level. However, attackers propose innovative attack models and enumerate
different techniques to bypass these defenses. Among them, information leakage vulner-
abilities play a significant role in revealing the internals of secured systems, where an
attacker can leverage subtle information from program memory to augment the state of
the art exploitation techniques. This motivated us to develop a technique is to showcase
the power of modern program analysis in automating many aspects of the hacking process,
and effectively evading widely deployed protection mechanisms.
Chapter Overview
This chapter is divided into seven sections. In section 1, we provide a brief background
of major security vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and format string vulnerabilities,
then discusses the various attack defense methods deployed in modern operating systems
against these threats. In section 2, we state the problem we are solving. Section 3 mo-
tivates the importance of local and remote exploit synthesis. The detailed design and
implementation of our tool is presented in section 4. Section 5 presents our experimental
methods and results. Prior attempts and other related work on exploit synthesis are shown
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in section 6. Finally, our future work plans are listed in section 7.
3.1 Background
This section gives a brief background about various security threats such as buffer over-
flows, format string vulnerabilities and number of attack resistance techniques against these
vulnerabilities.
3.1.1 Buffer Overflows
A buffer overflow condition exists when an application tries to put more data into a buffer
than it can hold. In such cases, the data overflows into the nearby memory regions inside
memory. This is a serious security vulnerability as an attacker can use malicious data to
overflow the buffer and thereby hijack the control flow of the program. Buffer overflow
vulnerabilities have been exploited for over 20 years and are the primary reason for most
of the internet worms. These vulnerabilities only exist when developing applications using
languages that do not enforce run-time bound checking such as C/C++. In other words,
these vulnerabilities occur by the memory write operations on a buffer without sufficiently
checking bound of a user-supplied input.
3.1.2 Format String Vulnerabilities
In format string attack, an attacker uses string formatting features of certain library func-
tions to access the memory space of applications. Thus, format string attacks facilitates
information retrieval from the process memory and helps to bypass attack defenses when
used with other attacks based overflow related vulnerabilities. The format string attack
occurred when the user submitted data be used as a command in library functions. An
attacker can use this vulnerability, to execute arbitrary code on the machine, read values
from the stack or cause the application to crash.
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3.1.3 Attack defense Techniques
In this subsection, we discuss the common attack defenses employed in both operating
system and application level.
Address Space Layout Randomisation (ASLR)
ASLR[51][13] aims to introduce a certain degree of randomness into the addresses used by a
program at run-time. All modern operating systems adopt this countermeasure to prevent
an attacker from predicting the address space of an application. This solution causes
certain parts of a process’s virtual address space to become different for each invocation of
the process, with the effect that the associated memory addresses are not known a priori
from the attackers. To successfully launch the attack, the attacker needs to retrieve certain
addresses precisely from the process memory. Thus, ASLR relies on the low probability that
an attacker has in order to guess where each area is located. The idea of address space
randomization become stronger if some mechanism of entropy is present in the random
offsets. If we model the address that has to be guessed as a random variable, we can define
its entropy as a measure of the uncertainty associated with the address, and it increases
by either advancing the amount of virtual memory area space or reducing the period in
which the randomization occurs.
Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
In this approach, which is typically referred as NoExec, Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
or W ⊕X, helps to prevent the exploits from succeeding by marking certain pages of the
applications address space as non-executable. The general concept is to make the data
segment of the applications address space as non-executable, making it inaccessible for
attackers to execute the injected code.
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Hardening the Binary
Compilers for a number of operating systems now include techniques that aim to pre-
vent stack overflows being used to create exploits. Stack canaries are the most common
technique to harden the stack along with other run-time and compile-time checks. A
stack canary is a random value kept in the stack frame below the stored instruction and
base pointers. These canaries cannot prevent buffer overflows, but they can detect them
retroactively and terminate the program before an attacker influence the control flow. The
Canaries are inserted into the stack just after the function prologue and are verified just
before the function epilogue to see if the value has been modified by any user’s input. If
there is any modification in the canary value is detected, the application is aborted.
RELRO is a generic mitigation technique used to harden the data sections of an exe-
cutable linkage format(ELF) binary. It supports two different modes of operations named
”Full RELRO” and ”Partial RELRO. When RELRO is enabled the ELF sections are re-
ordered, and the internal data sections (.got, .dtors) precede the data sections (.data and
.bss) of the program. The full mode supports all features of the partial mode and also makes
the entire global offset table (GOT) as read-only, where the GOT is used for dynamically
linking the executable.
Position-independent Executable (PIE)
Position-independent executable(PIE) is a specially compiled and linked executable that
get loaded into random locations in memory on its execution. In other words, the machine
codes are placed anywhere in the primary memory and get executed properly regardless
of the absolute address. PIE is not very efficient unless ASLR is enabled. Randomizing
memory allocation locations makes memory addresses harder to predict for an attacker who
is attempting a memory corruption exploit. This PIE along with ASLR provides better
protection against code reuse attacks.
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3.2 Problem Statement
Given an application binary containing buffer overflow and information leakage vulnera-
bility design an automated tool for control flow hijack attacks that bypass various attack
defenses in place.
3.3 Motivation
Software bugs remain as an unavoidable factor in almost all software products. Bugs that
result in memory corruption are very common security flaws in systems developed using
unsafe programming languages like C/C++. However, these bugs become serious security
vulnerabilities when an attacker leverage it to trigger the execution of malicious code. In
any software systems, memory related bugs are very critical, and the one that can be
exploited by attackers are typically the most serious among them. However, to decide
whether the bug is useful for an attacker for malicious purposes or not quite easy. For
instance currently Ubuntu bug repository contains more than hundred thousands of open
bugs, finding critical security bugs among them is a tedious task and remains as an open
challenge.
Programming languages like C/C++ rely on data integrity with the program and en-
hances the programmer’s control and the effectiveness of the resulting programs. Software
bugs that result in memory corruption are very common security flaws, in systems de-
veloped using unsafe programming languages such as C and C++. For instance, once a
variable is allocated in memory, there are no built-in safeguards to ensure the contents
of the variable always fit into the allocated memory space and lead to serious application
errors or crashes if the memory overflows. The buffer is a continuous memory location
that holds data, and it will cause to overflow into next memory locations when the size of
the supplied data is more than the allocated size. An attacker can exploit bugs in mem-
ory operations memory allocation, de-allocation, pointer assignment, format strings, and
call to library routines so that he can hijack the control flow. The major buffer overflow
vulnerabilities consist of stack overflow, heap overflow, and integer overflow.
50
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities are common when developing software using unsafe lan-
guages such as C/C++, which do not enforce run-time bounds checking. These two lan-
guages account for more software than any other programming languages that exacerbate
the security of related software systems. In the early days of stack buffer overflows, it
was common for an attacker to include malicious code as part of the payload to overflow
the buffer. As a result of code injection, an attacker could simply set the return address
to a known location on the stack and execute the instructions that were provided in the
buffer to cause control flow hijack. Since the first reported buffer overflow attack, the Mor-
ris worm in 1988 [50], system designers have been developing protection mechanisms to
eradicate them. Most of these protections mechanisms involve modifying operating system
parameters and adding additional compile time checks.
Even though there are many attack defenses and these safeguards have raised the bar
significantly, the attackers still continue finding creative ways to defeat them. Reactive
protection mechanisms cannot prevent human error. Thus, the solution may be better de-
sign and testing of software or the use of languages that enforce run-time bounds checking.
This philosophy is credible but also expensive and is unlikely to be done at the cost of
performance. Another unfortunate fact is that current state of the art formal verification
and automated testing techniques can not fully guarantee a bug proof software system.
However, various researches are going on to make dynamic and symbolic program analy-
sis techniques scalable to a wide category of software and ensure security by automated
testing.
Previous researches in this area revealed that thinking in the way of an attacker to gen-
erate an exploit for a bug would be an efficient way to provide a defense mechanism against
such vulnerabilities. However, this is not always feasible, as it can be a time-consuming
activity and requires low-level knowledge of file formats, assembly code, operating system
internals, and CPU architecture. However, various researchers proposed automated exploit
generation systems relying on standard code injection attacks. The unfortunate fact is that
current research in automated exploit generation does not fully address these attack de-
fenses because of the complexity and significant manual effort associated with systematic
program analysis to mitigate the defense systems. Motivated by this, we proposed an au-
tomated remote exploit generation system that leverages the information leakage present
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in a software system to generate working exploits that bypass the various attack defenses
deployed in the application and operating system. Comparing to the previous works in
this area our exploit generation approach is quite practical and easily extended to various
other architectures and platforms. Our binary instrumentation approach for vulnerabil-
ity detection is lightweight and significantly reduces the performance overhead within the
automated exploitation framework.
3.4 Design and Implementation
Randomization-based defenses provide reasonable entropy against control flow hijack at-
tacks that measure the randomness in the number of bits of the underlying architecture.
However with the presence of information leakage this entropy can be reduced significantly
by leaking addresses from process memory to bypass the attack defenses. Figure 3.1 repre-
sents the design overview for our technique that consist of dynamic binary instrumentation,
taint analysis, vulnerability detection (information leakage and buffer overflow), retrieval
of target memory addresses and finally the exploit synthesis.
Our significant contribution is the design and implementation of an end to end auto-
mated system considering all attack defenses in place. We wrote code for dynamic binary
analysis using the Pin instrumentation framework that helped us to write a taint analysis
routine from the scratch. We used return-to-libc attack model for control flow hijack at-
tacks and generated the payload by automatically retrieving subtle memory details using
information leakage attacks. Simply, given an application binary and the remote server
running the application, our tool automatically generates payload using binary instrumen-
tation and information leakage if a potential vulnerability exists.
3.4.1 Vulnerability Detection
As a first step, we detect various conditions leading information leakage vulnerability. For-
mat string vulnerabilities play a significant role in the process of leaking address space
of target process that can be used to mitigate the existing defenses. Further, we detect
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Figure 3.1: Design overview of automated exploit generator
buffer overflow vulnerabilities and synthesize attack vector to execute reverse shell payload.
These vulnerabilities are detected using dynamic binary analysis featuring binary instru-
mentation. A dynamic taint analysis on target application helped to track the vulnerable
input to generate attack vector. Format string vulnerability is detected followed by binary
instrumentation stage by analyzing the presence of tainted source and format string in the
stack frame created by variadic functions such as fprint, sprintf, snprintf, and vsnprintf
Similarly, buffer overflow vulnerabilities are detected by fuzzing techniques followed by
dynamic taint analysis.
Dynamic Binary Analysis
The two principal analysis for the vulnerability detection are the static and dynamic anal-
ysis. However, both these approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. If we
use dynamic analysis, we can not cover all the code but we will be more reliable. If we
53
use static analysis, we can cover the code, but we can not get the context information at
runtime. We avoided static analysis technique and chose more promising dynamic analysis
for vulnerability detection for a variety of reasons. We found that the dynamic analysis is
more attractive and promising in the precise analysis and retrieval of run-time information
of program state. Furthermore, it reduced the false positives and allowed us to reason
about actual executions leading to more accurate security analysis. Thus, the outcome
of dynamic binary analysis was two-fold, it helped us to gather sufficient information on
data flow and subtle details of memory content, which later we used in the detection of
the format string and buffer overflow vulnerabilities and finally in the exploit synthesis.
For these, we wrote dynamic binary analysis routines called pintools, using the Pin binary
instrumentation framework.
Dynamic Binary Instrumentation
Security researchers in both academy and industry use numerous techniques for gather-
ing the subtle run-time information from an application binary, but each one adds some
complexity and performance issues. The very common techniques involve (1) execution
trace listing, where traces are logged into a database at run-time for the execution of a list
of the instructions, modification of register values and memory locations. (2) emulation
where the application executes inside a special environment that provide programmatic
control over the execution of the emulated system to analyze the required data-flow. (3)
binary instrumentation a technique whereby extra code is injected into the normal execu-
tion flow of a binary to collect run-time information. This method widely used in areas
for performance profiling, error detection, capture, and replay. The injected code handles
the arbitrary analysis of the target program. This method of gathering run-time informa-
tion is provided by a number of different frameworks including Pin [43], Valgrind[48] and
DynamoRIO[16].
Dynamic binary instrumentation relies on instrumenting code just before it run. We
chose Pin[43] instrumentation framework for the binary analysis using its JIT(Just In Time)
mode of instrumentation. In this mode Pin creates a modified copy of the application on the
fly to inject the code for run-time analysis and the original code never executes. Also, Pin
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binary instrumentation engine support programmable instrumentation by providing a rich
set of APIs in C/C++ to write instrumentation tools called PinTools. Pin is more efficient
and robust in performance, and it applies compiler optimizations on instrumentation code.
The Pin framework also supports a probe mode in which instrumentation code is added
directly to the original program along with inserting jumps to instrumentation code.
Dynamic Taint Analysis
Taint analysis is an iterative process whereby an initial set of memory locations and reg-
isters are marked as tainted, and then at each subsequent instruction element is added
or removed from the set, depending on the semantics of the instruction being processed.
The concept is defined iteratively as marking a location as tainted if it is directly derived
from user input or another tainted location. This is a well-known technique adopted by
various researchers in both industry and academia to reason about the control flow of user
inputs in the context of precise security analysis. However, we avoided using any existing
framework considering the inherent complexity associated with such frameworks, instead
wrote our analysis routine together with binary instrumentation. We used taint analysis
to reason about a set of memory locations and registers that are controlled by user inputs
by monitoring the user input by controlling the read() system call when the application
executes.
Taint analysis mainly consists of taint tracking and taint propagation according to our
predefined taint policies. The purpose of dynamic taint analysis is to track information flow
between sources and sinks. Any program value whose computation depends on data derived
from a tainted source is treated as tainted, and all other value is considered untainted.
We used shadow memory to store all the memory locations and registers tainted by user
input. Taint introduction rules are implemented such that all variables, memory cells, and
registers are initialized as untainted. Then all the memory locations corresponding to the
input source are added to shadow memory, and all the destination registers affected by
the source of entry are also marked tainted. Taint propagation rules specify the status of
data derived from tainted or untainted operands. For each data movement and arithmetic
instructions in the application execution path, shadow memory is modified by the addition
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of new memory locations or the removal of existing memory locations depending whether
data is tainted or untainted respectively.
3.4.2 Exploitation Techniques
The introduction and deployment of defense mechanisms against control flow hijacks mo-
tivated attackers to propose more sophisticated exploitation techniques. Analyzing the
history of such techniques we can see that code reuse attacks are first introduced as re-
sponse to protection against Data Execution Prevention (DEP) that resist code injection
by enabling the memory region either writable or executable. These defenses give birth to
code reuse exploitation techniques, unlike code injection attacks that redirect the control
flow of the program to code written by the attacker, code reuse attacks redirect the control
flow executable section of code chosen by the attacker. The most commonly discussed
types of code reuse attacks are return-into-libc [47] attacks and return-oriented program-
ming (ROP) [55] attacks. These code reuse attacks are categorized based on the granularity
of the reused code fragments called gadgets. In return-into-libc attacks, the gadgets are
entire functions whereas in ROP attacks a gadget is a series of machine instructions ter-
minating in a ret instructions. ASLR substantially provided reasonable defenses against
code reuse attacks, but it was defeated using gadgets from non-randomized segments and
surgically returning into libc by overwriting the global offset table (GOT) [56]. However
with the deployment of position-independent executable(PIE) and RELRO, a generic miti-
gation technique to harden the data sections of an ELF binary, it became difficult to break
ASLR.
Exploitation technique consists of two stages (1) information leakage attack and (2)
buffer overflow attack. In the first phase, we took advantage of the format string vulnera-
bility present in the application to leak address space of the target process. In the context
of format string vulnerability, we read the contents of stack memory from target process
and use the precise information to synthesize buffer overflow exploit. In the second stage,
we leverage the information gathered from target process’s memory to generate a buffer
overflow exploit that bypasses all the defenses in the target machine and spawn a reverse
shell back to attacker machine.
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Information Leakage Attack
One of the significant parts of the technique is the process of leaking memory addresses
from the process memory of a remote server for defense mitigation. Attackers used to
pop a sequence of data from the stack by passing a sequence of the format string, in
this way they reason about the process memory for further levels of attacks. However,
these approaches introduce some amount of inaccuracy in later stages of exploitation if not
properly executed. Also, the size constraints commonly associated with the format string
source also limit the capabilities of an attacker. So we avoid such blind data retrieval
from the stack and use direct parameter access technique, a way to directly access a stack
parameter from within the format string to point to the specific addresses in the stack.
Thus, we calculate the relative offsets to the specific memory location containing stack
canary, libc function and buffer address using the dynamic binary analysis. During the
binary instrumentation stage, we extracted precise information regarding the stack frames
and buffer at run-time from the binary. Once we detected format string vulnerability in our
analysis stage, we calculated the relative offset to stack canary address, buffer controlled
by user input and the memory pointing to the libc function in the stack. These details
along with stack frames are used to mitigate the existing defenses and synthesize exploits
in the later stages.
Figure 3.2: Leaking canary value
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For instance, the Figure 3.2 depicts the stack canary in memory relative to the format
string parameter. The value of offset is calculated using the information obtained from the
binary run-time analysis. The corresponding format string attack vector to leak canary
value for remote server’s process memory is ”%offset$x”. Our next step is to calculate
the address of the libc function and a tainted buffer using direct parameter format string
attack. When the system executes the main function the return address of libc start main
is pushed to the stack. To leak libc function address, we measured the offset to the stack
address containing this value. Using these addresses retrieved from the memory, and
the information read from glibc binary, we calculated the base address of libc functions.
Similarly, we leaked addresses to bypass all possible defenses we introduced earlier in this
paper. We also found that without the presence of format string vulnerability, we can
use some specific system calls (e.g., write()) present in application to leak libc function
addresses from process memory. We developed automated exploits using this technique
without the presence of format string vulnerability too and bypassed ASLR, DEP, and
RELRO.
3.4.3 Control Flow Hijack Attack
Figure 3.3: Stack layout of a return-to-libc attack
Once gathered subtle information regarding stack frame, buffer and leaked addresses
to bypass defense schemes, we chose a minimal but efficient attack model to spawn a
reverse shell from the target machine. We chose return-to-libc attack model for control
flow hijack and leaked all the required parameters from the target memory space using
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format string attack. Return-to-libc is a code reuse attack that mitigates W ⊕ X (aka
DEP) by overwriting the return address of buffer with the system() address in libc function
and passing the reverse shell payload as the argument. In this way, we mitigated defenses
such as ASLR, DEP, Stack Canary, PIE, and RELRO. Figure 3.3 represent the typical
stack layout of a return-to-libc attack. In the next step, we designed a more complex
attack model to handle the exploit scenario when the format string vulnerability is not
present. This attack model is based on return-oriented programming (ROP) using the
gadgets collected from binary and libc functions, and thus we mitigated few defenses such
as ASLR, DEP, and RELRO.
3.5 Experimental Methodology and Evaluation
In this section, we describe the experimental setup and the remote exploitation attack we
performed.
3.5.1 Experimental Setup
We set up a virtual test environment using VirtualBox on a host running Mac OSX with a
2GHz Intel Core i7 CPU and 8GB RAM. The virtual network consists of a target machine
running Ubuntu 13.10 with kernel 3.11.0 and an attacker machine running Ubuntu 12.04
with kernel 3.5.0. We allocated 2GB memory per each virtual machines, and VirtualBox
networking adaptors are configured to create a software-based network that is visible to
the selected virtual machines, but not to applications running on the host or to the outside
world. For our experiment, we used a vulnerable echo server that forks a child process
for each incoming connection, compiled by GCC 4.6.3. The pre-forking concurrent server
operates by pooling some listening processes at startup that offers superior performance
to other concurrent server designs e.g. handling requests iteratively, or spawning a child
process for each new client request. The benefits make it a very popular method of handling
requests for HTTP, IMAP, and SMTP servers.
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3.5.2 Experimental Results
We used an echo server application for evaluating the exploit synthesis. Fig 3.4 repre-
sents the vulnerable part of source code that contain format string and buffer overflow
vulnerability. The function vulnerable() is prone to both format string and buffer over-
flow vulnerabilities, where the format string vulnerability is associated with snprintf() and
buffer overflow vulnerability with memcpy(). However, our vulnerability detection tech-
nique does not perform analysis on the source code level. The vulnerability detection and
the exploit construction is on purely based on the analysis of application binary compiled
with GCC 4.6.3 with defenses such as position independent executable (PIE), stack canary,
full RELRO and non-executable stack. ie. The source code is compiled with the following
command gcc -pie -fpie -z relro -z now -o server server.c. The server is setuid enabled
and runs with has the privilege of super user, runs on port 4444 and executes with root
privilege in Ubuntu 13.10. In this machine, ASLR is enabled and the application runs with
all available protections and client machine can interact with this server using telnet or
netcat.
The attacker machine is a linux machine running Ubuntu 12.04, where we perform vul-
nerability detection, binary analysis and launch attack to the target server. We performed
dynamic binary instrumentation and tainted analysis on the target application on the at-
tacker machine. Also, we extracted the width of all stack frames setup during the binary
analysis stage. This first stage is followed by fuzzing techniques to detect buffer overflow
vulnerability. Once the vulnerabilities are detected using the binary analysis guided by
fuzzing, the offset to the various addresses of interest is calculated. These offsets form
initial format string attack vector, for leaking sufficient memory information from the tar-
get process. In short, we detected vulnerabilities using fuzzing guided by dynamic binary
instrumentation and extracted subtle information regarding the binary for later stages of
exploitation.
The next stages of exploitation were to leak addresses from the memory of remote server
process. The attacker connects to the remote server using netcat and sends format string
attack vectors to collect sufficient memory information, required for breaking the defenses
against control flow hijack attacks. Thus, using the format string attack, we collect the
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address of buffer, libc start main, and stack canary value. With this retrieved information,
we perform a return-to-libc attack that opens a reverse connection from remote machine
binding a root shell back to port number 7777 in attacker machine. The whole process
starting from the binary instrumentation, vulnerability detection, format string attack
and final reverse shell exploitation took in 3.6 seconds. Figure 3.5 represents the payload
synthesized for spawning a reverse root shell.
...
void vulnerable(char *buffer,int sock){
char local_buffer[50];
char msg[1024];
snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,buffer);
write(sock,msg,strlen(msg));
memcpy(local_buffer,buffer,strlen(buffer)+30);
return;
}
void PerformOperations(int sock){
int n;
char buffer[256];
bzero(buffer,256);
n=read(sock,buffer,255);
if(n<0){
error("ERROR reading from socket");
}
buffer[256]=’\0’;
vulnerable(buffer,sock);
}
...
Figure 3.4: Format string and buffer overflow vulnerability
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Figure 3.5: Reverse shell payload
The absence of format string vulnerability limits an attacker capabilities, and so we
designed a more subtle and complex attack model that leverages the presence of certain
system calls such as read() in the application to leak the libc function address from remote
server’s process memory by using buffer overflow vulnerability. We managed to retrieve
some libc function address through buffer overflow attack by overwriting the return address
with the procedure linkage table (PLT) address of write(), which is common function
present in many low-level system programs. When gathered one libc function, we could
calculate the run-time libc base address and there by any other libc function addresses
in the target process. The second stage of exploitation was to make a page containing
data section writable by using mprotect() function calculated using the libc base address
and calling write() system call to write payload into the memory. In the third stage, we
sent system() to the previously chained call followed by payload string. In this way, we
synthesized ROP exploit by making use of libc functions and a minimal number of gadgets
collected from application binary. This remote exploitation without relying on format
string took 5 seconds to get a reverse shell by breaking ASLR, DEP, and Full RELRO
defenses.
3.6 Related Work
Shacham et al. [61] studied the effectiveness of address-space randomization and found that
its efficacy on a 32-bit architectures is restricted by the number of bits available for address
randomization. Also, they demonstrated a brute-force attack to convert any common buffer
overflow vulnerabilities into an exploit that works against systems protected by address
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space randomization. Their analysis suggested that run-time address space randomization
is far less efficient on 32-bit architectures than commonly believed. Also, compile time
randomization is more powerful than run-time randomization because the address space
can be randomized at a much finer granularity at compile time than run time.
Brumley et al. in their paper Automatic Exploit Generation (AEG) [11] introduced
the first fully automatic end-to-end approach for exploit generation. Also, they showed
that how exploit generation for control-flow hijack attacks can be represented as a formal
verification problem. In AEG, the analysis was solely based solely on source code using
a technique called preconditioned symbolic execution to narrow the search space. Their
significant contributions include the introduction of preconditioned symbolic execution, a
path prioritization algorithm for vulnerability detection and the generation of a working
exploit for the discovered vulnerable bug. However, the exploitation technique did not
consider the protection mechanisms deployed in the application and operating system.
Schacham et al. [55] introduced the technique of return-oriented programming, in which
an attacker induce arbitrary behavior in a program by diverting the control-flow without
injecting any executable code. In return-oriented programming attacker chains together
gadgets, short instruction sequences end with return instruction already present in a pro-
gram’s address space. This technique could be seen as a generalization of traditional return-
into-libc attacks, but more generic and powerful. They constructed a Turing-complete set
of building blocks using gadgets collected from standard C library to demonstrate the
wide applicability of the technique. Giampaolo et al[56] presented a new attack against
programs vulnerable to stack-based buffer overflows that bypassed two of the most widely
adopted protection techniques, namely write xor execute only (W ⊕X) and Address Space
Layout Randomization (ASLR). In their attack, they extracted the base address of library
functions from the address space of the vulnerable process and used this information to
mount a return-to-libc attack. However, these attacks are ineffective in the presence of
position-independent executable (PIE) and stack canary.
Brumley et al. presented MAYHEM [20], a new system for automatically finding ex-
ploitable bugs in binary programs, which was a logical extension of author’s previous work
Automatic Exploit Generation to binary code. MAYHEM worked on binary code without
debugging information and accompanied by a working shell exploit. This work introduced
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hybrid symbolic execution for combining on-line and oﬄine execution thus maximizing
the benefits of both techniques along with index-based memory modeling that allows to
efficiently reason about symbolic memory at the binary level. However, this work did
not address the various defense scheme present in the application and operating system.
Zeldovich et al. [63] in their work performed a systematic analysis of defenses against
Return-Oriented Programming and code reuse attacks by building a formal model of at-
tacks, their requirements, defenses and their assumptions. They also used SAT solver to
perform scenario analysis on their model by analyzing the defense configurations of a real
world system by reasoning the hypothetical defense bypasses.
3.7 Future Work
As future works, we would like to evaluate the automated exploit generation technique
on significant real world application. Also, we are interested in exploring other ways of
leaking information from process memory in the absence of format string vulnerabilities.
Even though, we developed a prototype to achieve this in the presence of certain system
calls and successfully bypassed ASLR, DEP, and RELRO, bypassing stack canary, and PIE
remains as future work. Currently, we are using fuzzing techniques along with dynamic
binary analysis to reveal the vulnerabilities. Also, we intend to integrate our string solver
to symbolic execution engines by reasoning about various paths in execution tree for bug
detection. We would like to augment the efficiency and reduce the complexity in exploit
synthesis using SMT-based ROP compiler. We would like to reason about the application
of string based solvers in the context of exploit synthesis and integrate it into an end-to-end
testing system. Finally, we would like to suggest more sophisticated attack resistance that
incorporates techniques from cryptography and information flow analysis against control
flow hijack attacks.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
This thesis presents a decision procedure for the theory of bit-vectors and strings, as an
efficient solver for the detection of security vulnerabilities in symbolic execution based
analysis tools for programs written in C/C++. We designed a new search space pruning
technique based on the binary search to solve constraints involving large string values.
Also, we replaced existing linear search based length consistency check between the integer
and string theory of Z3-str2 with binary search based heuristics, which enabled it to solve
constraints containing large string values in the integer mode as well.
We built the bit-vector theory support atop of Z3-str2 string solver and evaluated
the decision procedure on a set of real security vulnerabilities collected from Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures repository. Also, we evaluated the binary search based
heuristic on a benchmark suite containing 205 test instances, that contains string operations
on the large value of strings. We compared the performance of the technique with the prior
version of the solver and CVC4. The evaluation revealed that the binary search based
approach is about 229 times faster than naive approach implemented in the prior version
of the Z3-str2 solver, and 288 times faster than CVC4.
The final part of the thesis include the design and implementation of an automated
exploit synthesis system, for the detection of buffer overflow and information leakage vul-
nerabilities in low-level system codes, and thereby performing control flow hijack attacks
that bypass all known attack defenses in Linux based machines.
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